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A Unified Concept of Population Transfer
(Revised*)
CHRISTOPHER M. GOEBEL**
Population transfer is an issue arising often in areas of ethnic ten-
sion, from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Western Sahara,
Tibet, Cyprus, and beyond. There are two forms of human population
transfer: removals and settlements. Generally, commentators in interna-
tional law have yet to discuss the two together as a single category of
population transfer. In discussing the prospects for a unified concept of
population transfer, this article is the first to compare and contrast in-
ternational law's application to removals and settlements.
I. INTRODUCTION
International attention is focusing on uprooted people, especially
where there are tensions between ethnic populations. The Red Cross has
spent a significant proportion of its budget aiding what it called "dis-
placed persons,"" removed en masse from their abodes. Ethnic cleansing,
a term used by the Serbs, was a process of population transfer aimed at
removing the non-Serbian population from large areas of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina.2 The large-scale Jewish settlements into the Israeli-occupied
Arab territories continue to receive publicity. Why not examine these and
other mass removals and settlements of people under a single category,
called population transfer?
Recent discussions at the United Nations and elsewhere, led by
human rights activists, have hinted at such a unified treatment of popula-
tion transfer in an effort to focus attention on "stateless people" faced
* In order to correct errors that were made in editing the version of this Article
formerly published in volume 21, number 1 of the Journal, this revision replaces the
previous version in its entirety.
** Associate, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, on leave as a Fulbright scholar in
France, 1993-94. J.D., 1991, Harvard University. An early draft of this Article was presented
at the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization [hereinafter U.N.P.O.] Conference
on the Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer, Tallinn, Estonia, January 11-13,
1992. The author expresses gratitude for comments on drafts by Henry Steiner and Michael
van Walt van Praag. Support also came from Marc Granowitter, Christa Meindersma and
the author's father, Edward W. Goebel, Jr. The foregoing do not necessarily share the views
expressed herein.
1. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 36TH MEETING (SECOND PART), at 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/
SR.36/Add.1 (1992). These operations were in Africa, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East,
and Europe, which reflects the broad scope of the problem.
2. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., THE ETHNIC
CLEANSING OF BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 5 (Comm. Print 1992).
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with either removal from an area or settlement into one.3 A conference in
1992 deliberated on situations that occurred in what conference partici-
pants called "sovereign states" (e.g. Poland, claiming to have experienced
principally large-scale removals in the form of expulsions by Hitler and
Stalin), as well as areas "occupied" now or at some point in the recent
past (e.g. Western Sahara, the Baltics States, East Timor and Tibet, by
massive settlements and removals), "nations without a state" (e.g. Kurdi-
stan, principally by removals), the lands of "indigenous peoples" (e.g.
Aboriginals of Australia and Chakmas of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, by
settlements and removals), the lands of "ethnic minorities" (e.g. Albani-
ans in Kosova, principally by removals), and others.4 This approach to-
ward removals would take into account situations ranging from the more
traditionally recognized expulsion of a minority from a country to the
forced removal of a significant number of indigenous people for a dam
project. Settlements would include those occurring on a large scale both
across U.N.-recognized borders and internally. In any event, population
transfer, however defined, should be confused neither with refugee move-
ments5 nor with normal migration on an individual basis for economic
3. Just in the last three years, the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities [hereinafter U.N. Sub-Commission] has begun to adopt
resolutions covering both forms of movement under the single category of population trans-
fer. See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF
MINORIrIES ON ITS FORTY-FOURTH SESSION, 70-72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/58 (1992)
[hereinafter U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28]; UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON THE
PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES ON ITS FORTY-SECOND SES-
SION, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/59 (1990) [hereinafter U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution
1990/17]; UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF
MINORITIES ON ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/65 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28].
4. UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS OF
POPULATION TRANSFER: CONFERENCE HELD IN TALLIN, ESTONIA, JANUARY, 1992, at 6 (David
Goldberg, rapporteur, 1992) [hereinafter U.N.P.O. CONFERENCE REPORT].
5. Although when refugee movements are large, such a distinction becomes difficult.
Refugees, strictly defined, move freely out of their own political motivation. Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force
Apr. 22, 1954); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967); RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MI-
GRATION LAW 393 (2d ed. 1988). See also Institute of International Law: Resolutions
Adopted at its Bath Session, art. 1, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 15 (Supp. 1951). In contrast, settlers
and removed people in the context of this Article, rather than being motivated by a per-
sonal, individual desire for political asylum, are treated as group phenomena whereby plan-
ning and implementation of the movement, as well as the ultimate motivation, belong to
governments. It is often difficult to tell whether a refugee moves freely. On a practical level,
then, the categories of population transfer and refugee movements may overlap. One differ-
ence is that refugee movement, strictly defined, occurs across international frontiers,
whereas population transfer can also occur within states. Regarding the Kurdish people, the
period before the Gulf War saw movements that were population transfer, the removal of
Kurdish people caused in part by the Iraqi government's use of poison gas. See MINORITY
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reasons. 6 For years now, some in the policy-making community have min-
gled population transfer's two forms.' Despite such discussions, commen-
tators on international law traditionally have not followed suit.8 Besides a
handful of scholars, including those recognized herein, few have published
lately on either form of population transfer. A unique aspect of the pre-
sent Article is that, while examining a broad concept of population trans-
fer, it compares removals and settlements under applicable international
law. Indeed, to some extent population transfers must be examined on a
case-by-case basis. Rather than do so, however, this Article serves as an
overview of issues relating to population transfer.
In the context of this Article, as a basic rule, transfers of both types
are meant to have in common the element of moving a large number of
people, in relative rather than absolute terms,9 and state involvement or
significant acquiescence in the movement. The specific people involved
can be categorized as removed people, settlers, and, where there are set-
tlers, original inhabitants of the area receiving the settlers. From there,
analysis becomes more difficult. Forced removals, in specific circum-
stances, have been adjudged crimes against humanity. Settlements as well
as removals, under certain restrictions, have violated doctrines of human-
itarian law. Discrepancies exist between the two types of transfer along
RIGHTS GROUP, THE KURDS: MASSACRE BY GAS (1989); MIDDLE EAST WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN IRAQ (1990); Judith Miller, Iraq Accused: A Case of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 12, 16. By contrast, flows of Kurdish population in the post-Gulf War
period, more than beforehand, involved refugees. For example, the landmark U.N. Security
Council Resolution 688 addressed Kurdish refugees from Iraq. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
6. Regarding migration, see generally PLENDER, supra note 5. See also Myron Weiner,
Security, Stability and International Migration (Dec. 5-6, 1991) (unpublished manuscript
presented at the Conference on the Impact of International Migration on the Security and
Stability of States, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
(differentiating between normal migration, on the one hand, and population movement with
substantial government involvement on the other).
7. See, e.g., Thayer Scudder & Elizabeth Colson, From Welfare to Development: A
Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Dislocated People, in INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION
AND RESETTLEMENT 267 (Art Hansen & Anthony Oliver-Smith eds., 1982).
8. Some analyses, such as Israel Shahak, A History of the Concept of "Transfer" in
Zionism, 18 J. PALESTINE STUD. 22 n.3 (1989) and Alfred M. De Zayas, International Law
and Mass Population Transfers, 16 HARV. INT'L L. J. 207 (1975) [hereinafter De Zayas, Law
and Transfers], treat population transfer as principally the removal of people, whereas
other writings touch on settlements as a phenomenon isolated from removals. See, e.g.,
Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since
1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44 (1990).
9. Cf. U.N.P.O. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7 ("Should numbers be part of
the definition, or should the definition focus on the rationale and intention involved in the
transfer?"). This conference report proposed a unified definition of "population transfer":
"the movement of large numbers of people, either into or away from a certain territory,
with state involvement or acquiescence of government and without the free and informed
consent of the people being moved or the people into whose territory they are being
moved." Id. (emphasis added). This definition turns on the element of consent. Also, it
raises the issue of territorial definition, treated herein.
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such doctrinal lines, and also as to whether the element of consent is a
criterion proper to population transfer. 10 The extent to which those and
other differences resolve themselves, and to which the two types of trans-
fer thus collapse into a unified and coherent category of treatment, will
depend on the future development of international law towards not only
the practices of population transfer but also their effects on removed peo-
ple, settlers, and original inhabitants.
II. PRACTICES OF POPULATION TRANSFER
A. Population Transfer as a Crime Against Humanity and Possible
Extensions
The mass removal of citizens across internationally recognized bor-
ders of a state is called mass deportation or expulsion. Mass deportations,
such as those perpetrated by Nazi Germany, may violate the Nuremberg
principles and, therefore, constitute war crimes or crimes against human-
ity in times of international" and, it has been argued, civil war.12
As a recent example, the expulsion of masses of non-Serbs from east-
ern Croatia across front lines, by bus and other methods, was accom-
plished through coercion, including threats, violence and discrimination.' 3
Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the mass deportation of people to
create ethnically pure areas was a strategy important to Serbia.' These
10. The U.N. Sub-Commission was "[c]oncerned that the movement of people is often
achieved either without free and informed consent of those people being moved or without
the consent of those people into whose territory they are being moved." U.N. Sub-Commis-
sion Resolution 1990/17, supra note 3. See also U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28,
supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 70-71 (preamble).
11. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, arts. 6(b)-(c), 59 Stat.
1546, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288; Indictment of the International Military Tribunal, in 1
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG 27, Count 3, §§ B, J, at 51-52, 63-65 (1947). See
also Alfred-Maurice De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. 234,
235-36 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1975) [hereinafter De Zayas, Forced Resettlement]; U.N.
Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3. Mass deportations should be distin-
guished from deportations on an individual basis. Ruth Lapidoth, Expulsion of Civilians
from Areas under Israeli Control in 1967, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 97, 102-04 (1991) (It is more
inconclusive whether customary international law has prohibited the deportation of individ-
uals, as opposed to en masse). U.N. General Assembly Resolution 95 (1) of December 11,
1946, gave expression to the general applicability of the Nuremberg principles. 2 LASSA OP-
PENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 616-19 (7th ed. 1952). But see JuLIus STONE, No PEACE, No
WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 17 (1969).
12. De Zayas, Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 221; UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY
COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECURITY COUN-
CIL RESOLUTION 808, at para. 47, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter SECURITY COUNCIL
808 REPORT].
13. HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 75-81 (1992).
14. See id. at 71; John F. Burns, Bosnian Strife Cuts Old Bridges of Trust, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 1992, at AS (noting that although non-Serbs also carried out deportations of Serbs,




expulsions contributed a substantial number of the non-Serbs who exited
Bosnia and Herzegovina." Occurring during international war, these ex-
pulsions surely could face adjudication for crimes against humanity. Had
they occurred earlier, before the international community recognized the
independence of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situations
would have been deemed uniquely civil wars with the front lines inside
national boundaries.16 Nevertheless, the coercive tactics of "ethnic purifi-
cation 1 7 allegedly used by Serbian militia would not have changed with
the varying classification of the war. This case weighs against drawing a
strong distinction between international and civil war in determining
whether population transfers are crimes against humanity.
As seen through the nature of the above examples, the treatment
under international law of removals of people depends on whether the
transfers occur during belligerency. Yet even in peacetime, mass expul-
sions across borders of citizens"' or of aliens who were in the originating
territory lawfully, such as Asians from Uganda, 9 are circumscribed
closely by human rights law.2" This is triggered by the presence of dis-
criminatory or racist characteristics in the expulsions.
2
1
Of course, not all governments undertaking removals across interna-
tional borders lack concern for those being removed. The desire as a sov-
ereign to "save" a threatened minority abroad by "inviting" it into the
sovereign territory motivates some of these governments. An example is
where an element of exchange is involved, like the 1922-23 swap of
Greeks and Turks.22 In such cases, despite any state benevolency, jurists
15. HELSINKI WATCH, supra note 13, at 199 (categorizing the war as an international
armed conflict involving two states, Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina).
16. For an analysis of the conflict in former Yugoslavia as a civil war, see generally
Charles Lewis Nier III, Note, The Yugoslavia Civil War: An Analysis of the Applicability
of the Laws of War Governing Non-International Armed Conflict in the Modern World, 10
DICK J. INT'L L. 303 (1992).
17. Burns, supra note 14.
18. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Protocol 4, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept.
3, 1953).
19. See Richard Plender, The Ugandan Crisis and the Right of Expulsion Under In-
ternational Law, 9 INT'L COMM. JURISTS REV. 19, 27-30 (1972).
20. See PLENDER, supra note 5, at 474 n.174, 477; R.C. Chhangani, Notes and Com-
ments, Expulsion of Ugandan Asians and International Law, 12 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 400, 402,
405-07 (1972); De Zayas, Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 244-45.
21. According to the U.N. Sub-Commission, "the practice of population transfer [refer-
ring to both removals and settlements] is discriminatory in its application and . . . inher-
ently leads to widespread and systematic discrimination." U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution
1991/28, supra note 3. See also U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at
70-71 (preamble).
22. See Alfred M. De Zayas, A Historical Survey of Twentieth Century Expulsions, in
REFUGEES IN THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR 15, 17-20 (Anna C. Bramwell ed., 1988) [hereinafter De
Zayas, Historical Survey]. During the Nuremberg trials, it was recognized that the motive
for transfer could go beyond ill-treatment of those transferred. A government official could
escape liability if military necessity motivated him. De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra
1993
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focus on more than just the attitude of the state. The perspective of the
transferees counts, too. For example, the Institut de Droit International,
in its 1952 session, expressed concern for those being removed, especially
as to whether their movement was voluntary.
23
The argument has been advanced that crimes against humanity ap-
ply outside of armed conflict even to the removal of people that starts
and finishes within the territory of a state. The argument zelies on the
analogy to apartheid in South Africa.24 The relocation of millions of
blacks to artificially created homelands in the land-locked interior of that
country, an effort by zonation programs of a development branch of the
government, raised sufficient international condemnation to be consid-
ered censured under customary international law. Integral to the govern-
ment's action of transferring the people were racism and discrimination.
Yet, other massive removals within borders, such as occurred in Guate-
mala,2 East Timor,'2  Australia, 7 Brazil,2 s Egypt, Argentina and Para-
guay, 29 met less international disapproval. At least in the last five in-
stances, which were relatively without belligerency in the sense of armed
conflict, some deference may have been given to governments' motiva-
tions for economic development. 0 Still, as in South Africa, whether the
note 11, at 236.
23. 44 ANNUAIRE INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 138 (1952) (Sienna Session). See
also PLENDER, supra note 5, at 474. Writing about removals, De Zayas comments that "most
transfers of population are not likely to be voluntary." Alfred M. De Zayas, The Legality of
Mass Population Transfers: The German Experience 1945-48, 12 E. EUR. Q. 1, 6 (1978)
[hereinafter De Zayas, German Experience].
24. De Zayas, German Experience, supra note 23, at 253; De Zayas, Forced Resettle-
ment, supra note 11, at 236. But see Lapidoth, supra note 11, at 104 (Drafters of the Nu-
remberg Charter may have meant to cover mass deportations undertaken specifically for
forced labor and extermination).
25. See WEARNE PHILLIP, THE MAYA OF GUATEMALA (Minority Rights Group Report No.
62, 1989); Counterinsurgency and the Development Pole Strategy in Guatemala, CULTURAL
SURVIVAL Q., vol. 12, No. 3, 1988, at 11; CULTURAL SURVIVAL, THE INDIANS OF GUATEMALA:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (1987); CRAIG W..
NELSON, WITNESS TO GENOCIDE: THE PRESENT SITUATION OF INDIANS IN GUATEMALA (1983);
SURVIVAL INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALAN REFUGEES Now THREATENED BY RELOCATION (1984).
26. See JULIAN BURGER, REPORT FROM THE FRONTIER: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S IN-
DIGENOUS PEOPLES 142 (1987); FINNGEIR HIORTH, TIMOR PAST AND PRESENT 61 (1985); Steven
Erlanger, East Timor, Reopened by Indonesia, Remains a Sad and Terrifying Place, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1990, at A18.
27. See MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP, REPORT No. 35, ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIANS (1988) (In
Queensland, mining policies, which effectively destroyed some of the economic and social
basis of Aboriginal traditional lifestyle, involved large scale removals).
28. See MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP, REPORT No. 15, WHAT FUTURE FOR THE AMERINDIANS
OF SOUTH AMERICA? (1977). In Brazil, the Sobradinho Dam project resettled about 60,000
urban and rural people. MICHAEL CERNEA, INTERNAL REFUGEES AND DEVELOPMENT-CAUSED
POPULATION DISPLACEMENT (Harvard Institute for International Development, Development
Discussion Paper No. 345, 1990).
29. See CERNEA, supra note 28, at 24-25. In Egypt, dam projects have removed and
resettled at least 100,000 people; in the border between Argentina and Paraguay, submer-
sion projects have removed some 45,000. Id.
30. If there is sufficient public interest for the transfer and proper compensation to-
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effects on those being moved rise to the level of systematic racial discrim-
ination is a factor that should be considered in determining whether any
large scale population transfer violates customary international law. s"
At least one international body has treated removal within borders
with disapproval. The invasion of Cyprus by Turkish troops in 1974 re-
sulted in the widespread eviction and population transfer of over 170,000
Greek Cypriots from their homes in the northern part of Cyprus. In Cy-
prus v. Turkey, the European Commission on Human Rights discussed
population transfer: "The Commission.. . considers that the transporta-
tion of Greek Cypriots to other places, in particular the forcible excur-
sions within the territory controlled by the Turkish army, and the depor-
tation of Greek Cypriots ... constitute an interference with their private
life."'s2 The Commission therefore linked a form of population transfer,
the removal of people, to the right to private life. This right is related to
the right to security of persons. Because the Commission saw forced
transportation as an infringement of the right to private life, the case set
a precedent regarding the use of force to transfer populations. The case
emphasized the voluntariness of the transfer.
Most importantly, in terms of any division between transfers across
borders and those only within, the language in Cyprus v. Turkey distin-
guished between those removals within the boundaries of the territory
controlled by the Turkish army and those across borders. The Commis-
sion condemned both extents of transfer. This condemnation invites
greater scrutiny towards removals occurring under belligerent conditions,
such as military occupation, even though only within state borders.
In brief conclusion about removals, belligerency is present in situa-
tions highly condemned under international law, though the need for bel-
ligerency is reduced by the presence of systematic racial discrimination,
as in Uganda or South Africa. Voluntariness is an important issue for
removals. In order to invoke crimes against humanity, the blatant lack of
voluntariness characterizing the victims of World War II-era transfers is
wards those being moved, these factors should play into the determination of the transfer's
permissibility. Claire Palley, Population Transfer and International Law 3 (Jan. 3, 1992)
(draft paper presented at the U.N.P.O. Conference, on file with author of this Article).
31. "A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, en-
courages or condones (a) genocide ... (f) systematic racial discrimination, . . .or (g) a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS]; accord Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co.,
Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). See also International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, art. 5(d)(i), (ii), 660
U.N.T.S. 194, 220, 5 I.L.M. 352, 356 [hereinafter Discrimination Convention] (prohibiting
racial discrimination within the borders of a state, occurring in conjunction with limitations
on freedom of movement and residence); Palley, supra note 30, at 4. For further discussion
of freedom of movement, see infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
32. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482, 519-20
(1976) (Commission report) (emphasis added).
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vital. Furthermore, the issue of voluntariness has some importance re-
gardless of state intention. As shown by Cyprus v. Turkey, it also has
some consequence whether or not a transfer crosses international borders.
B. Population Transfer Under Humanitarian Law
The Baltic States, Cyprus, East Timor, the West Bank, Tibet, the
Western Sahara, and Eritrea have been locations of the other form of
population transfer: settlements."8 These movements, unlike some expul-
sions, have never been formally adjudged crimes against humanity. Be-
cause these locales have been sites of military occupations, the settle-
ments of the occupants' people have raised the issue of humanitarian law,
a part of international law that emphasizes the protection of the individ-
ual not only during and following belligerency, but, according to some
scholars, also during peacetime occupations.34
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War presents one of the clearest ex-
amples of positive international law governing population transfer:
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies .... Individual or
mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to
that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited regardless
of their motive.35
Furthermore, the Geneva Convention may outlaw population transfers
into occupied lands not only during hostilities, but also afterwards until a
final political settlement has been reached in those lands.8 6 Protocol I to
the Geneva Convention states that the Geneva Convention applies to
"armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the
right of self determination as enshrined by the Charter of the United Na-
tions""3 and contains language similar to article 49.
33. Palley, supra note 30, at 5. For situations not documented elsewhere in the present
article, see MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP, REPORT No. 5, ERITREA AND TIGRAY 4-14 (1983). See
generally U.N.P.O. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 26-33.
34. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
35. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 318 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention]. Regarding the extent to which the Geneva Convention constitutes customary
international law, see SECURITY COUNCIL 808 REPORT, supra note 12, at para. 37 ("The Ge-
neva Conventions constitute rules of international humanitarian law and provide the core of
the customary law applicable in international armed conflict").
36. See Geneva Convention, supra note 35, at arts. 1, 2, 4, 17, 47, 6 U.S.T. at 3518,
3518, 3520, 3530, 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at 287, 288, 290, 300, 318.
37. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 1, para. 4,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 7, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1397 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Regarding the extent to
which Protocol I constitutes customary international law, see Palley, supra note 30, at 7
VOL. 22:1
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These provisions dictate that, but for certain specific exceptions, set-
tlements in an occupied territory contravene international law. While
forced or forcible movement is illegal under these codes,3 8 an important
issue is that of voluntary movement. On the one hand, the voluntary na-
ture of an act should not be interpreted to legalize what would otherwise
be considered a violation of an international standard.39 This is especially
true if the movement involves the purposes and effects, on both those
transferred and original inhabitants, that the Geneva Convention was
crafted to prevent. 0 On the other hand, there are legal difficulties inher-
ent in defining "voluntary." In this regard, it should be pointed out that
most settlements, if not forced, are facilitated by government actions.
One such tool is incentives, like increased industrialization in the area
targeted for transfer as occurred in Soviet-occupied Estonia and Latvia." '
Even if voluntary settlement on an individual basis is permissible under
article 49, the settlement programs of the 1980s and 1990s, especially the
ambitious programs like those of the Indonesian 2 and Chinese 43 govern-
ments, must be examined on an individual basis to determine whether
(stating that "many states have not ratified [Protocol I], and it remains doubtful to what
extent the Protocol is a reflection of customary law").
38. Cf. De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236. Regarding the other form
of transfer, i.e. removals, the "clear prohibition of forced resettlement in time of war has
been codified." Id.
39. The U.N. Sub-Commission has recognized the link between the right to security of
persons and the issue of population transfer. See U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1990/17,
supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commis-
sion Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 71 (preamble). In other contexts involving that
right, the consent of an individual does not legitimize violations of an international norm.
See Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES 115, 120-124 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984) (explaining the right to security of
persons in connection with the right-to-life norm).
40. Roberts, supra note 8, at 84.
41. See Romauld J. Misiunas, The Baltic Republics: Stagnation and Strivings for Sov-
ereignty, in THE NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY 214 (Lubomyr
Hajda & Mark Bessinger eds., 1990); cf. GEOFFREY A. HOSKING, THE FIRST SOCIALIST SOCI-
ETY: A HISTORY FROM WITHIN 399 (1st ed. 1985). See generally Alan Cowell, Pope, in Bal-
tics, Faces Tangle of Ethnic Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at A3.
42. See generally MARIEL OTTEN, TRANSMIGRASI: MYTHS AND REALITIES, INDONESIAN RE-
SETTLEMENT POLICY, 1965-1986 (1986).
43. See HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES & THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET, THE
LONG MARCH: CHINESE SETrLERS AND CHINESE POLICIES IN EASTERN TIBET 5-9 (1991) [here-
inafter EASTERN TIBET]; ASIA WATCH, MERCILESS REPRESSION: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN TI-
BET 15 (1990); Sechin Jagchid, Discrimination Against Minorities in China, in HUMAN
RIGHTS CASE STUDIES 389, 401-02 (Willem A. Veenhoven ed., 1975); 134 CONG. REC. S15,500,
S15,501-02 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1988) (China trip report by Sen. Leahy); Note, Human Rights
in Tibet: An Emerging Foreign Policy Issue, 5 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 193 (1992) (China has
been attempting since 1983 to dilute the Tibetan identity by transferring numerous Han
Chinese into Tibet). While this Note adds that "[w]hether the Chinese are intentionally
transferring Han into Tibet is a matter of complex debate," Human Rights in Tibet: An
Emerging Foreign Policy Issue, supra at 196 n.25, see infra text accompanying notes 115,
117 and 121 for other important issues besides that of the intent of the transferring
government.
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the participants meet the criteria of "voluntary" settlers.
In the case of settlements, these difficulties about voluntariness lead
to the question of whether consent should be relevant at all to a broad
concept of population transfer. Yet, in the instance of removals, volunta-
riness is of paramount concern. The differing weight put on voluntariness
will have to be reconciled for the two categories of transfers to be col-
lapsed satisfactorily into a single category for legal treatment.
Just as national security might motivate governments to remove mi-
norities through expulsion," civilian settlements across the internation-
ally recognized borders of a state are sometimes claimed necessary for the
security of the transferring power and, therefore, essential to preserve
public order and safety."' For example, the Indonesian government in
controlling regions at the borders of lands that it dominated was said to
have an explicit strategic objective that depended on settlements.6
In the Israeli Supreme Court's most important decision on popula-
tion transfer, Beth-El,47 Justice Witkon sustained a prior opinion that the
fact that requisitioned lands were intended for Jewish civilian settle-
ments did not deprive such requisitioning of its security character. 48 In
addition, although no terrorist activity actually took place, Justice
Witkon refused to distinguish Beth-El from a case in which terrorism had
occurred.49 The position of the Israeli court reflected the above-men-
tioned rationale behind Indonesian settlements. Both allowed the move-
ment of civilians to gain control of other civilians. Even if population
transfer is intended for national security purposes, settlements can cause
such conflicts among settlers and original inhabitants- that settlements
may only exacerbate security problems.50 Such cases suggest the illegiti-
44. See De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236.
45. Roberts, supra note 8, at 84.
46. Carmel Budiardjo, The Politics of Transmigration, THE ECOLOGIST, voL. 16, No. 2/3,
1986, at 111 (as related in 1985 by the Indonesian minister for population transfer).
47. H.C. 606/78, Ayub v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) PisKm1 DIN 113, translated and
summarized in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337 (1979) [hereinafter Beth-Ell.
48. Id. at 340.
49. Id. at 339. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 186 (1957); ci. H.C.
302/72, Sheikh Suleiman Abu Hilu v. Israel, 27(2) PISKEI DIN 169, translated and summa-
rized in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384 (1975) (court unanimously upholding arguments that
steps taken were necessary due to the terrorist activities and acts of sabotage which in fact
took place in the area).
50. See generally Marcus Colchester, The Social Dimensions of Government Sponsored
Migration and Involuntary Resettlement: Policies and Practice (Jan. 1986) (unpublished
manuscript prepared for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Is-
sues in Geneva, available through author of this Article). In the context of the occupied
Arab territories, Roberts, Falk, and Weston lend support for two points: first, settlements
are almost never necessary for genuine military or security purposes and do not, in fact,
serve any such purposes; second, even if justified for military needs, transfers still violate
rules of international law. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 84; Richard A. Falk & Burns H.
Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and
Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 129, 147-48 (1991); cf. U.N.
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macy of the national security rationale.
The issue of control over civilians exercised through population
transfer causes some concern from the viewpoint of original inhabitants.
True, voluntariness or consent, from the perspective of settlers, is a con-
fusing, inconclusive subject. However, regarding original inhabitants, the
subject gains significance, as will be explained below. 1
National security arguments, such as the above, may lead to attempts
to suspend respect for human rights. The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,52 article 4(1), permits states in urgent circumstances
to suspend or breach the right to security of the person, a right which
population transfer may affect. Such derogation, however, has little rele-
vance, if any, where a government undertakes settlements in order to
change the demographic structure or the political, cultural, religious, or
other characteristics of the original inhabitants in the receiving area.53
The permanent nature of such changes means that the population trans-
fer should never be justified on the temporary grounds necessary for
derogation.
This is especially true where transfer occurs during prolonged mili-
tary occupations. Prolonged military occupations have received some at-
tention as a distinct category, having the characteristic of "belligerency
ending. ' '54 The main conventions relating to military occupations, includ-
ing the Geneva Convention and the 1907 Hague Regulations,55 provide no
meaningful variation in their rules because of the length of an occupa-
tion." Indeed, in addition to covering belligerent occupations, these con-
ventions may also address occupations in which the belligerency has sub-
sided.57 The rights of the occupant during peacetime diminish markedly
Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 70-71 (preamble).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 109-116.
52. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter Political Covenant].
53. The U.N. Sub-Commission was "[d]isturbed by reports concerning the implantation
of settlers and settlements in certain countries, including particular occupied territories,
with the aim to changing the demographic structure and the political, cultural, religious,
and other characteristics of the countries concerned." U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution
1990/17, supra note 3. See also U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3;
U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 71 (preamble). Derogation, gen-
erally, is "extremely troublesome from the human rights viewpoint." Lillich, supra note 39,
at 120.
54. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 51-53; cf. Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142.
55. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art.
3, 36 Stat. 2277, 2290, 205 CONSOL. T.S. 277, 295-97 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
56. The exception is the "one year after" provision of the Geneva Convention. Geneva
Convention, supra note 35, at art. 6, para. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3522, 75 U.N.T.S. at 292. However,
this provision is of little importance. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 55-56; COMMENTARY ON
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 22 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958); MICHAEL BOTHE
Er AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 57, 59 (1982).
57. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 52; Adam Roberts, What is Military Occupation?,
1984 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 253. But see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL
STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 43 (1987) ("[T]here are, in fact, so many situa-
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relative to its rights during belligerency."8 Where population transfer ex-
tends from belligerent to prolonged occupation and then into peacetime,
the occupant may assert progressively fewer rights. This, again, brings
into doubt the temporariness justification for population transfer men-
tioned above.
Yet Justice Landau, concurring in Beth-El, supported the Israeli set-
tlements against this obvious doubt by saying that the hope that a politi-
cal solution someday will be reached justifies population transfer.59 Re-
garding any particular occupation, Israeli or otherwise, even if one is
satisfied that the Hague Regulations, and not the Geneva Convention, are
in effect,"0 article 43 of the Hague Regulations limits the freedom of the
occupant to undertake population transfer. This is especially true in ex-
tended or peacetime occupation.61 Although many of the above-cited
sources concern the occupied Arab territories, it bears mentioning that
the Chinese and Indonesian governments see Tibet and East Timor, re-
spectively, as important military zones. 2 Even if these are legitimate gov-
ernmental interests related to national security during peacetime, the
governments do not automatically gain free discretion to undertake popu-
lation transfer into those areas.
If conventional law, including the relatively lenient Hague Regula-
tions, applies to a given case of population transfer, governmental discre-
tion to undertake transfer must include reference to the humanitarian
concerns of all individuals affected by the population transfer. s The
needs of both settlers and original inhabitants become particularly rele-
vant as an occupation moves through its stages, from belligerent to pro-
longed and into peacetime.
If prolonged and peacetime, in addition to belligerent, occupations
tions in which the applicability of the Geneva Conventions .. .has been denied that the
common practice has been rejection of the law, rather than its formal recognition and
implementation").
58. C. Lleewellyn Jones, Military Occupation of Alien Territory in Time of Peace, 9
GROTIUS Soc'Y TRANSACTIONS 149, 159-60 (1923). See also Roberts, supra note 57, at 273-79.
Where military necessity exists, an occupying government has "considerable discretion."
Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 138. However, military necessity generally ends when
belligerency stops.
59. Beth-El, supra note 47, at 392.
60. See Yoram Dinstein, The Judgment in the Matter of Pitchat Rafiah, 3 TEL Aviv
UNIV. L. REV. 934 (Hebrew, 1973).
61. See Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142 (A duty is imposed upon the occupant
vis-a-vis the original inhabitants); cf. H.C. 337/71, Christian Society for the Holy Places v.
Minister of Defense, 26(1) PISKEi DIN 574, translated and summarized in 2 ISR. Y. B. HUM.
RTS. 354, 355 (1972).
62. Regarding East Timor, see BURGER, supra note 26, at 142-43; Budiardjo, supra note
46, at 111. See generally FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF
GENOCIDE: ANALYSES AND CASE STUDIES 378-83 (1990). Concerning Tibet, see EASTERN TIBET,
supra note 43, at 2-4; What McMahon Wrought, THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 1987, at 59.
63. Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human
Rights, 8 ISE. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 104, 111-12 (1978); Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142.
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are reasons for continuing prohibition of settlements, that signifies that
the positive law prohibiting settlements is moving away from any neces-
sity for belligerency. This may be compared to cases of removals. As men-
tioned above, a presence of racism or discrimination pushes the prohibi-
tion of removals away from a dependence on belligerency.
C. Population Transfer Under Principles Regarding Colonialism
The practice of population transfer is also part and parcel of coloni-
alism. One case of population transfer into territory that was "colonized,"
according to the formal U.N. regime, occurred in the Western Sahara. 4
The Moroccan takeover of this area was marked by the settlement of over
200,000 Moroccans into it, as well as the removal by "brutal tactics" of
some groups of original inhabitants of the area. 5 The Western Sahara
situation went before the International Court of Justice."6 The connection
between population transfer and colonialism was patently clear. Condem-
nations of colonialism came from the ICJs7 and, subsequently, the U.N.
General Assembly s and noted experts.69 In situations of traditional
colonialism earlier than the Western Sahara, a nexus had been estab-
lished between the use of force and its impact on a people's identity. 0
64. See generally VIRGINIA THOMPSON & RICHARD ADLOFF, THE WESTERN SAHARANS:
BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT (1980); DAVID LYNN PRICE, THE WESTERN SAHARA (The Washing-
ton Papers, vol. 7, No. 63, 1979).
65. CLAUDE BONTEMS, LA GUERRE Du SAHARA OCCIDENTAL [THE WAR OF THE WESTERN
SAHARA] 72 (1984). See also JOHN DAMIS, CONFLICT IN NORTHWEST AFRICA: THE WESTERN
SAHARA DISPUTE 61-69 (1983). Although the brutality of Moroccan forces is well known and
documented, it should be noted that not all of the population movement was forced by the
Moroccans. Some of it was encouraged by the Polisario Front, a pro-independence move-
ment, in face of the invasion. Id. at 72.
66. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). See THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 64,
at 167.
67. The ICJ declined to declare the Western Sahara "terra nullius" but also failed to
declare the territory Moroccan or Mauritaurian. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at para. 162.
While the Western Sahara case does not discuss population transfer directly, the opinion is
important nonetheless for the connection it makes between self-determination and colonial-
ism. Id.; Myron H. Nordquist & Nells P. Nordquist, Self-Determination: The Cases of Fiji,
New Caledonia, and the Western Sahara, in 82 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 429, 439-42
(Michael P. Malloy ed., 1988). From this connection it is arguable that population transfer
affects the right to self-determination. See Nordquist & Nordquist, supra at 443 (discussing
this possible effect). But see DAMIS, supra note 65, at 60 (positing that the ICJ's decision
was essentially political).
68. See DAMIS, supra note 65, at 94.
69. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINOR-
ITIES, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION; IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLU-
TIONS, para. 69 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1, (1980) [hereinafter SELF-
DETERMINATION].
70. The U.N. General Assembly, in the context of colonialism, noted that "the use of
force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable
rights and of the principles of non-intervention." G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Rela-
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The Western Sahara and its aftermath furthered this link.
D. Some Limits on the Prohibition of Population Transfer Practices
The Western Sahara may be contrasted with situations of indigenous
groups, such as the Chakmas of the Chittagong Hill Tracts or the people
of various sparsely inhabited Amazonian provinces of Bolivia, Peru, Ecua-
dor, Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. These also faced what most consid-
ered to be settlements by ethnically distinct, dominating groups en-
couraged or even forced by U.N.-recognized governments.' The above-
mentioned nexus between force and its effect on a people's identity may
have existed even in these instances of transfer."2 In contrast to the West-
ern Sahara and other examples of traditional colonialism, however, these
settlements occurred within the governments' U.N.-recognized borders.
At issue, then, was the possible constraint of article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter, which states that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. 7 As with remov-
als solely within domestic frontiers,7 4 in the case of settlements the con-
current presence of systematic discrimination, genocide, 75 or gross and
persistent violations of human rights76 countenances article 2(7). So does
the moral pressure of publicists like Theodoropoulos who recognize
colonialism outside the traditional U.N. definition. Theodoropoulos as-
serts that South Africa was the chief paradigm of "settler colonialism." '
tions]. The prohibition on the use of force is also now a rule of customary international law.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 1, 14, 98-101 (June 27).
71. See Hurst Hannum, New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L.
649, 668 n.71 (1988) (Approximately 300,000 Bengalis were settled in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts from 1978 to 1988); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF
MINORITIES, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES; WRITTEN STATEMENT SUBMITTED
BY THE NORDIC SAAMI COUNCIL, INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP
FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND ANTI-SLAVERY INTERNATIONAL, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS IN CONSULTATIVE STATUS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/NGO/3 (1991); Colchester,
supra note 50, at 12 (regarding the other regions, besides the Chittagong Hill Tracts, that
the text accompanying the present note mentions).
72. See Hannum, supra note 71, at 668; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28,
supra note 3, at 71 (preamble).
73. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. The U.N. Sub-Commission has not limited its concern
to settlements occurring across international frontiers. See U.N. Sub-Commission Resolu-
tion 1990/17, supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3; U.N.
Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 70-71 (preamble).
74. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 24 (example of South Africa).
75. See discussion infra part III.B.2.
76. See RESTATEMENT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 31, § 702.
77. CHRISTOs THEODOROPOULOS, COLONIALISM AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 51-52 (1988).
Theodoropoulos writes of "settler colonialism," calling it "colonialism" where restrictions
are "imposed on a colonial people by a colonial power existing geographically not apart from
its colony but instead within the colonial territory." Id. Cf. ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATE-
HOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 182 (1986) (Whether a state enjoys exclusive
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The South African government undertook removals, through zonation, to
clear the way to accomplish the other form of population transfer, settle-
ments."8 Both types of transfer started as well as finished within the
boundaries of that state.
However, for settlements as well as removals occurring within such
territorial limits, prohibition would be more meaningful if it came from
positive law in a rule explicitly about population transfers. Then, such a
ban would be less sensitive to issues defining territory. The following
analysis, though limited in scope, concludes that prohibitions on removals
within international frontiers are closer to benefitting from positive law
such as the Geneva Convention, and from doctrines such as those on
crimes against humanity, than are prohibitions on similarly located
settlements.
The most significant positive law directly prohibiting settlements
comes from the Geneva Convention. Therein, the condition of a given ter-
ritory is crucial. Whether an occupation is belligerent or peaceful, the Ge-
neva Convention requires that the territory be under some form of occu-
pation. 9 It is true that Protocol I, also addressing transfers, generally
applies beyond cases of military occupation,"0 but the language in Proto-
col I prohibiting transfers still refers strictly to transfers into or out of
areas under occupation. These two instruments also refer to removals
that, therefore, are somewhat constrained by the need for occupation."
Yet, removals, unlike settlements, have become the subject of crimes
against humanity. Related commentary shows that, in general, prohibi-
tions on removals may be less constrained by the very idea of territorial
definition. For example, there is the view espoused by some scholars, such
as Palley, that it was just as "unlawful" for the Allies and other countries
after World War II to deport Germans en masse as it was for Germany to
transfer populations during that war.85 One example is the deportation of
Germans from Sudetenland. The governments that transferred the
Germans did not technically "occupy" this area. Furthermore, there is the
power over a territory, such as through annexation thereof, is no longer a precise criterion
for determining what constitutes a colonial territory). Admittedly, international bodies to-
day do not emphasize decolonization. For example, the U.N. did not oppose apartheid in
South Africa under the pretext of decolonization. Therefore, any law that develops on set-
tlements within domestic frontiers will likely develop apart from doctrines on traditional
colonialism.
78. Colchester, supra note 50, at 20.
79. Massive and permanent settlements across borders of states, excluding mass repa-
triation of refugees, are policies implemented uniquely into areas experiencing prolonged
occupations. Settlements, as defined in this Article, almost never occur anymore from one
sovereign state to another. See John Hucker, Migration and Resettlement Under Interna-
tional Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 338-39 (Ronald St.
John Macdonald et al. eds., 1978). In this respect, settlements differ from removals.
80. See supra text accompanying note 37.
81. See Lapidoth, supra note 11, at 98-99.
82. Palley, supra note 30, at 17. See generally De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note
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argument, buttressed by analogy to events occurring in former Yugosla-
via, that crimes against humanity also apply to removals that, while oc-
curring during civil war, take place in unoccupied land.s"
More authoritative in dealing with the last-mentioned removals than
the opinion of scholars is Protocol II to the Geneva Convention, which
applies to armed conflicts without an international character.8 4 Protocol
II restricts population transfer, through article 17, in the form of remov-
als but does not refer to settlements.8 5 This exclusive reference to remov-
als further supports the above comparison. International deliberations re-
inforce this comparison. Cyprus v. Turkey condemned removals that,
while occurring in an area technically under occupation, started and en-
ded there. 6 By contrast, settlements starting and ending within a terri-
tory under occupation have not fallen subject to comparable concerted
deliberations. Thus, there may be some imbalance in existing interna-
tional legal treatment of the two types of transfers when they occur
within international frontiers. However, future developments in interna-
tional law towards dealing with the effects of population transfer may
overcome any such imbalance.
III. EFFECTS OF POPULATION TRANSFER
An adequate recognition of the effects of population transfer, along
with an accounting of the actual movement of people, is important, even
though these effects may be less detectable than the movement itself8 7 If
the effects of any population transfer escalate to the level of gross and
consistent violations of international human rights, that may give rise to
a violation of customary international law, although the law violated may
not necessarily refer directly to population transfer.
83. De Zayas, Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 221. See also supra notes 13-17 and
accompanying text.
84. Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II].
Protocol II supplements the Geneva Convention, article 3, which applies "in the case of
armed conflict not of an international character," by extending article 3 to certain conflicts
where signatories are capable of carrying out "sustained and concerted military operations."
Id. at art. 1. Regarding the extent to which Protocol II constitutes customary international
law, see Palley, supra note 30, at 7 (stating that "many states have not ratified [Protocol II]
and Protocol II is not yet customary law").
85. "The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons re-
lated to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military rea-
sons so demand." Protocol II, supra note 84, at art. 17.
86. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
87. The notion that "[p]eople and socio-cultural systems respond to forced relocation in
predictable ways," Scudder & Colson, supra note 7, at 267, suggests some hope for the es-




A. Effects on Those Being Moved: Freedom of Movement and Other
Rights
The most significant limitations on a state's right to control the
movement of people are based not on principles of economic interdepen-
dence but rather on rules designed to protect human rights."s The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, 9 article 13, provides that
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each State.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country.
The right to freedom of movement, an essential part of the right to per-
sonal liberty,90 is most likely part of customary international law.91 An
example of that status is the inclusion of freedom of movement in the
Discrimination Convention. 2 Yet, despite any special status for freedom
of movement, international law has yet to prescribe a satisfactory frame-
work for the movement involved in population transfer.
Just as the issue of the voluntary nature of movement is more com-
plicated in cases of settlements than removals, so also is the matter of
freedom of movement. The Universal Declaration, article 13, refers to
movement both within and across a state's internationally recognized bor-
ders.93 Settlers moving across borders unquestionably have the right to
leave their country. This raises a threshold question: are settlers freely
leaving their country? A government may participate in population trans-
fer to various degrees. It may sponsor settlers, for example financially, or
88. PLENDER, supra note 5, at 62.
89. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
90. Lillich, supra note 39, at 189. Cf. U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1990/17, supra
note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Res-
olution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 71 (preamble) (all documents referring, in conjunction with
population transfer, to freedom of movement and security of persons).
91. UNITED NATIONS, SECRETARIAT, EUROPEAN WORKSHOP ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARA-
TION; PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/89/1, at 101 (1989); Daniel Turack, A
Brief Review of the Provisions in Recent Agreements Concerning Freedom of Movement
Issues in the Modern World, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 95-96 (1979). Cf. Lillich, supra
note 39, at 151 (Rights to transnational movement "seem well-established in conventional
and perhaps even customary international human rights law"). But see id. for the position
that the right to internal movement, distinct from movement across internationally-recog-
nized borders, is not part of customary international law. Lillich's reasoning, however, is
based on the weak evidence that internal exile, such as that practiced by the former Soviet
Union, was not universally condemned.
92. See Turack, supra note 91, at 96.
93. The latter movement refers to the right to leave and to return to a country. The
Universal Declaration grants both citizens and aliens the right to leave any country but
limits the right to return to citizens of that country. See Universal Declaration, supra note
89, at art. 13(2). Article 12(1) and article 12(2) of the Political Covenant also allow both
citizens and aliens the right to leave any country but subject this right to article 12(3)
thereof. See Political Covenant, supra note 52, at art. 12; see also infra note 98 and accom-
panying text.
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encourage their movement, possibly without any monetary support. In ei-
ther case, the degree to which settlers are informed about all aspects of
their transfer, including their destination, affects whether they are con-
senting to their transfer in an informed manner. If uninformed, they are
not voluntarily, or freely, leaving the country.9 The Discrimination Con-
vention prohibits the use of racially discriminatory measures restricting
an individual's right to leave or return to his or her country. After a pop-
ulation transfer has taken place, settlers who move across borders have
the right to return to their home land should they so choose.
95
Population transfer within a state's recognized borders can violate
the right to free internal movement. Under the Universal Declaration, the
right to free internal movement is linked inextricably to the right to
choose one's residence.96 Depending on the specifics involved, a govern-
ment may violate both rights by removing people from their residences
due to, or as part of, transfer across as well as within a country's
borders.
97
Although containing language similar to that of the Universal Decla-
ration, the Political Covenant is qualified by article 12(3), which permits
restrictions on the right to internal movement if such restrictions "are
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order
(ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others .... " Article 12(3) may come into play where governments under-
taking economic development cause massive forced removals.98 Limits on
94. That poses further problems for the transferring government as well as settlers
when the latter, facing rough conditions, choose to return to the country of origin. A govern-
ment might not have an adequate infrastructure to aid them as equally in their return as in
their original movement. For example, settlers from the central islands of Indonesia report-
edly were not adequately informed of conditions in the outer, Indonesian-dominated islands.
See generally Ria Gondowarsito, Transmigrasi Bedol Desa: Inter-Island Village Resettle-
ment from Wonogiri to Bengkulu, 26 BULL. INDONESIAN ECON. STUD. 48 (1990); WORLD
BANK REP. No. 5597-IND, reprinted in INDONESIA REP. - HUM. RTS. Supp. No. 10 (1985).
95. If the motivation of the sponsoring or encouraging government is to create perma-
nent change in an occupied area, this casts doubt on the existence of a meaningful right to
return. See, e.g., Camille Mansour, L'Emigration des Juifs Sovietiques et le Processus de
Paix Israglo-Palestinien [The Immigration of Soviet Jews and the Israeli-Palestinian
Peace Process], LA POLITIQUE ETRANGARE, Summer 1990, at 327, 329 (discussing the effects
of administrative barriers).
96. The same article 13 of the Universal Declaration mentions both rights. Universal
Declaration, supra note 89, at art. 13.
97. Given the absolute character of the right to free movement, people should enjoy
that same right whether or not they are classified as citizens of the state whose government
is undertaking population transfer. A possible objection is that the Discrimination Conven-
tion fails to prohibit general discrimination against aliens by states based on nationality,
citizenship, and exclusions as between citizens and noncitizens. See Discrimination Conven-
tion, supra note 31, at arts. 1-3.
98. Cf. De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236. Without mentioning
whether states may properly derogate from the relevant provision of the Political Covenant,
De Zayas writes that forced resettlement is "incompatible" with the freedom of movement
provisions in both the Universal Declaration and the Political Covenant. Id.
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governmental abuse include article 12(3) provisions that restrictions on
freedom of movement be "necessary" and "consistent with other rights
recognized in the present Covenant." Regarding removals within interna-
tional borders, then, one can make a distinction between transfers such as
those in Egypt, Paraguay, and Argentina, which may have had some de-
velopment rationale, and transfers such as those in East Timor and Gua-
temala, which seem to have featured relatively less.
Other removals within international frontiers are unquestionably
void of a legitimate economic foundation. For instance, population trans-
fer also can occur during international and civil wars in which masses of
dislocated people suffer due to armed conflict. At the time of writing, in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, arrangements involving Serbs and Croats were
reported that were to carve Bosnia and Herzegovina into "communal pro-
tectorates."9 The comparison to zonation in South Africa 0 0 was vivid.
These arrangements threatened thousands of Bosnian Muslims, whose co-
alition had tried to preserve a multi-religious community, with removal
within, as well as across, the Bosnian borders.01 The extent to which
those who caused population transfers within those frontiers violated in-
ternational law depended in part on a balancing of the right to internal
free movement, backed by Protocol II prohibiting dislocation related to
conflict,0 2 with the Political Covenant's derogations and restrictions on
the right to free movement.
Where the occurrence of settlements results in the practice of remov-
als, conflicts may arise between different aspects of the right to freedom
of movement. Although part of customary international law, the rights to
leave and to return to a country are "difficult if not impossible to imple-
ment." 0 For example, in the present context, these rights might conflict
with the right to internal movement. Unless consistent with the Political
Covenant, article 12(3), settlers entering foreign lands cannot force origi-
nal inhabitants to be removed against their will; as a logical extension,
settlers cannot force original inhabitants into exile. °'0 Should original in-
habitants go into exile, they must enjoy the right to return. Furthermore,
original inhabitants have both the right to choose their residence and the
right to security of persons. 05
99. Lean on Croatia, Too, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 14, 1992, at 8.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 77 & 78.
101. See HELSINKI WATCH, supra note 13, at 13; Burns, supra note 14. For treatment of
removals occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina and resulting in the movement of people
across international frontiers, see supra text accompanying notes 11-17.
102. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
103. Lillich, supra note 39, at 151.
104. The Universal Declaration, article 9, states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." Universal Declaration, supra note 89, at art. 9.
105. The right to security of persons is given more concrete meaning by the guarantees
against arbitrary arrest and detention and against interference with one's privacy, family,
home, or correspondence spelled out in the Universal Declaration, articles 9 and 12, respec-
tively. See Universal Declaration, supra note 89, at arts. 9, 12.
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The problem that settlements across international borders may pose
with the right to free internal movement takes on an added complication
in cases of prolonged military occupation. Humanitarian law might con-
flict with human rights law. The Universal Declaration guarantees origi-
nal inhabitants the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state, but article 78, paragraph 1 of the Geneva Con-
vention provides that "[i]f the Occupying Power considers it necessary,
for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning
protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence
or internment." ' 6 A case-by-case analysis of population transfer during
prolonged occupation, where an occupant transfers its own people into
the occupied territory and these people in turn obstruct the movement of
original inhabitants, may turn on an assessment of "imperative reasons of
security" upon which the occupant relies.
Where such arguments fail, there is a clear connection between set-
tlements and the violation of human rights, stemming from the right to
free internal movement. Nevertheless, the violation does not occur to set-
tlers' rights, but rather to the rights of original inhabitants. The infringe-
ment is a by-product, though an important one, of population transfer;
whereas in cases of isolated, massive removals any infringement on
human rights may be more part and parcel of the actual population
transfer because those whose rights are violated more likely are the actual
transferees. At least where gross and persistent, violations of this type
support the permeability of internationally recognized frontiers for U.N.
or other attention.
This last comparison supports the above-mentioned conclusion that,
as a general rule, removals, more easily than settlements, may overcome
any limitations of territorial definition.1 0 7 Further developments in
human rights are important if a unified concept of population transfer,
encompassing both types of movement, is to develop in such a direction
that moves further away from the requirement of belligerency that
originated from crimes against humanity and humanitarian law.
B. Effects on Original Inhabitants
1. Effects of Population Transfer on Self-Determination
The voluntariness, or consent, of original inhabitants facing popula-
tion transfer is important to more than just their freedom of movement.
For example, where a government in undertaking population transfer
through settlements is motivated by a desire to have control over original
inhabitants of settled areas, the perspective of these last people becomes
relevant in another respect: did the original inhabitants agree to receive
settlers?
106. Geneva Convention, supra note 35, at art. 78, para. 1.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86.
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Consider original inhabitants to whom self-determination applies '0
and who also face population transfer. One historical example occurred
after World War II. The original inhabitants of Germany received
Germans removed from Poland and Czechoslovakia by these countries'-
governments. De Zayas is of the opinion that these population transfers
violated international law because the legitimate sovereign, the receiving
state of Germany, had not consented to receive them.10 9
By virtue of self-determination's applicability, the original inhabi-
tants on the receiving end of such removals must have unique identifiable
characteristics, including race or ethnicity, language, religion, culture, tra-
dition and history, that set them apart from their neighbors. However,
original inhabitants may not enjoy Germany's status as a well-established
sovereign. Instead, the unit of self-determination of original inhabitants
may be as an ethnic minority, indigenous people, nation without a state,
or people in a territory under occupation. In any such event, it is more
likely that population transfer will endanger the above special character-
istics than in the instance of a sovereign state.'1 0
Any group to which self-determination applies should have the op-
portunity to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development. . . ."I" When their land
108. The right, or even the principle, of self-determination in contemporary interna-
tional law is still to a large extent unclear in its precise scope and content. See generally
Daniel Thurer, Self-determination, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. 470 (Rudolf Bernhardt
ed., 1975); SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 69, at para. 7 (Self-determination pertains "to
all peoples and nations, and [is] .. . a prerequisite of the enjoyment of all the rights and
freedoms of the individual"); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMI-
NATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 41 (1990) (Most countries either have
not specifically addressed the right to self-determination or have done so in such general
terms that nothing is added to an understanding of its content). The author of this Article
does not intend to express an opinion on such scope and content but, rather, for purpose of
discussion only, assumes that self-determination applies to original inhabitants in question.
109. De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note 22, at 18.
110. See U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 70-71 (preamble);
Colchester, supra note 50, at 4. Third World countries often "view themselves as unrepre-
sented and disfavored in the development of international law," Mose L. Floyd, Iraq's Inva-
sion of Kuwait Sparks Migration into Jordan: A Third World Nation Copes With the Ad-
ministrative Nightmare of a Refugee Population, 5 GEo. IMMIG. L.J. 57, 65 (1991), and thus
without as much protection from international law. Minorities, indigenous, and other "state-
less" groups have greater reason to view themselves as unrepresented, disfavored, and un-
protected. Cf. P.J.I.M. de Waart, Statehood and International Protection of Peoples in
Armed Conflicts in the "Brave New World": Palestine as a U.N. Source of Concern, 5
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 3, 24 (1992) (expressing concern over the U.N. protecting the right to self-
determination of a stateless group against a state's discrimination based on race, creed, or
color).
111. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. ., at preamble, para. 2, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1960). See also Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 70, at 121. The
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter Economic
Covenant], imposes the obligation on states to "promote the realization of the right of self-
determination" and to "respect that right." Id. at art. 1. Relevant to self-determination is
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is subject to an occupying or otherwise alien power's population transfer,
original inhabitants may be stripped of the opportunity to determine
their status and to pursue their development and, thus, denied in overt
ways their access to self-determination. In the case of settlements, the
denial might occur when administrators and settlers of an occupying or
dominating power flood into the land of a distinct people, i.e. of original
inhabitants, and appropriate for themselves superior positions in differ-
ent aspects of society.
112
The problem becomes more acute and troublesome if alien superior-
ity results in subjugation, domination and exploitation of the original in-
habitants, effects which have been denounced as contrary to the U.N.
Charter and as constituting denials of fundamental human rights.1' 8 In
his writings about the other form of transfer, removals, at the level of
sovereign or occupied states, De Zayas recognizes the economic risks of
exploitation. He believes that in addition to being willing to receive
masses of expelled people, a state must also have the economic capacity
to do so. 1 ' "In addition, the social and cultural adequacy of the receiving
state ought to be considered,"1 5 he adds, thereby referring to political
domination and social subjugation. But slower to be recognized is that
these same effects may play out in cases of settlements as well as remov-
als. For example, if the sheer scale of a population transfer causes original
inhabitants to become a minority in their own homeland, that dampens
the possibility that they will ever realize self-determination. ' This may
whether people are distinct and have a capacity for self-management and ". . . a common
desire to establish an entity capable of functioning to ensure a common future." SELF-DE-
TERMINATION, supra note 69, at para. 56. For other elements of self-determination, see gener-
ally HANNUM, supra note 108, at 27-49.
112. That reasoning applies in cases of military occupation. See Asbjorn Eide, Human
Rights in a Pluralistic World, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION IN SPACE AND TIME 23, 42
(U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ed., 1990) (Those under military
occupation are entitled to express self-determination). However, such a denial is also possi-
ble in cases of outside domination that do not involve military occupation. Such cases might
jeopardize a people's right to "enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and
resources," provided for in the Economic Covenant, supra note 111, at arts. 1, 25. The Eco-
nomic Covenant also states, in the same article referring to self-determination, that "[in no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." Id. at art. 1. Furthermore, a
transferring government might violate original inhabitants' right to an adequate standard of
living, provided in the Economic Covenant, article 11, by restricting their freedom of move-
ment. See U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1990/17, supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission
Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3,
at 71 (preamble) (mentioning all above rights in conjunction with population transfer).
113. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 70.
114. De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note 22, at 3. He adds: "The arrival of millions
of expellees in a country already incapable to feed itself necessarily leads to chaos, both for
the native population of the receiving state and for the arriving expellees." Id. (emphasis
added).
115. Id. Cf. VERNON VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, ETHNICITY AND DISCRIMINATION 76
(1985) (referring to the effect on political processes of mixing societies deeply divided along
cultural lines).
116. See Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L
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happen even if the unit of self-determination being affected is not that of
an occupied state.
Whether international law takes account of such effects will depend.
on resolution of the dilemma over how to measure respect for a country's
domestic jurisdiction. For the future, the key factor may be whether and
how original inhabitants in areas flooded by settlers, originating and end-
ing within U.N.-recognized borders, are accorded and then able to realize
self-determination. Developments in the rights of indigenous peoples and
related land rights are also relevant, ' but change has come slowly. For
instance, in the revised text of the Draft Universal Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the right to self-determination was in-
cluded in only a compromising manner.""8 Moreover, in an important con-
vention on indigenous rights, there were provisions dealing only with re-
movals, and these provisions were "weak." 1 9
Self-determination does not always imply total independence from
outside groups, but it does give those to whom it applies some control
over their own destiny.12 0 Logically, settlements, whether across or within
international frontiers, may prevent a distinct group from determining its
& COMP. L.Q. 105, 109 (1976) (referring to the effects resulting from diluting and dispersing
a minority).
117. For example, as land rights relate to self-determination. For a discussion of the
relationship between self-determination, land and indigenous rights, see generally Hannum,
supra note 71, at 670-77. De Zayas makes the connection between land rights, respect there-
for, and humane approaches to the problem of population transfer. However, his examples,
which are removals and not settlements, occur across international frontiers. Nevertheless,
he points out the gradual public sensitization to the "right of peoples to their native soil,"
and opines that "the best and most humane solution [to problems caused by population
transfer] would be the increased permeability of national frontiers." De Zayas, Historical
Survey, supra note 22, at 33-34. See also id. at 23; De Zayas, German Experience, supra
note 23, at 5-6 ("The broad authority of sovereign states to pursue legitimate ends [through
population transfer] should not be exercised to the detriment of a people's right to inhabit
their native soil").
118. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES,
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES; REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INDIGE-
NOUS POPULATIONS ON ITS EIGHTH SESSION, at Annex II, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42
(1990). Only minor changes were introduced for the 1991 session.
119. Hannum, supra note 71, at 668 n.72 (citing the International Labor Organization
Convention No. 107, art. 12).
120. VAN DYKE, supra note 115, at 221 ("[A]n exercise of self-determination does not
necessarily mean that the choice will be for independence. One of the potential choices is for
autonomy within the framework of the state and given reasonableness on both sides this is
the choice, or compromise that will be made"); Peter Malanczuk, The Kurdish Crisis and
Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 114, 124
(1991) (referring to self-determination as a "sufficient degree of autonomy within the ex-
isting state structure"); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SEMINAR ON THE EFFECTS OF RACIAL DIS-
CRIMINATION ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
STATES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/22 (1989) (Self-determination may only imply "self-
development").
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own status and development particularly when the group's members do
not want to receive the influx. Therefore, self-determination, should it
apply to original inhabitants faced with population transfer, brings into
play the element of consent. Self-determination thereby plugs a gap that
otherwise exists between removals and settlements on the issue of con-
sent. In this Article's discussion of this issue, before this section on self-
determination, the conclusion has been that consent pertains more to re-
movals than settlements. Self-determination, however, with its focus on
the original inhabitants affected by settlements, brings out the impor-
tance of voluntariness to the process of settlements. It is, therefore, an
important factor to a unified approach to population transfer.
The foregoing analysis advocates a shift in international attention
away from governmental motives for undertaking settlements and to-
wards the point of view of those directly affected by settlements. This
shift parallels existing international treatment of removals. The Institut
de Droit International recognized that, in addition to the importance of
examining governmental motives for causing removals, the perspectives of
removed people are also a significant factor in determining the permissi-
bility of transfers. Yet governmental motives retain importance. The gov-
ernmental practices of racism and discrimination lead to condemnation of
removals. Where governments act on similar motives in undertaking set-
tlements, this overlap also supports a unified concept of population
transfer.
2. Effect of Population Transfer on Rights Regarding Genocide
There has been concern that people subjected to massive population
transfer, either by facing settlers or by themselves being removed, have
been threatened with genocide.12 1 For instance, in Indonesian-ruled East
Timor population transfer occurred in both forms. Concurrently, due to
the inhumane conditions imposed there, some commentators believe that
genocide happened. 2' The U.N. has adopted the following definition of
genocide through the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide: "Genocide means . . . acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,
121. See U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 71 (preamble);
DeZayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236 (expressing concern over genocide for
removals but not for settlements). As an instance of concern expressed over genocide for
settlements as well as removals, which the author of this Article cannot confirm as actual
genocide, see CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS COMMISSION, LIFE is NoT OURS: LAND AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS, BANGLADESH (1991); The Chittagong Hill Tracts,
INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS NEWSLETTER, July/Aug. 1991; IN-
TERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, Doc. No. 5, THEY ARE Now BURNING
VILLAGE AFTER VILLAGE: GENOCIDE IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS (1984).
122. See CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 379; Erlanger, supra note 26 (100,000
to 200,000 East Timorese died from 1974 to 1980); Budiardjo, supra note 46 (200,000 died);





According to Dinstein, "[tihe right of peoples to physical existence
corresponds to the prohibition of genocide.'' 1 In focusing, therefore, on
the effects of population transfer on the right to existence, at least two
issues arise. One is the distinction between genocide and ethnocide. The
latter is a sub-category of the former. Yet, "[tihe suppression of a culture,
a language, a religion, and so on is a phenomenon that is analytically dif-
ferent from the physical extermination of a group.' 25 Concern over geno-
cide in the sense of mass death applies to relatively few cases of popula-
tion transfer. The meaning of ethnocide, which might also coincide with
-the denial of self-determination, pertains to relatively more instances of
population transfer.1
2
A second issue important to the relationship between population
transfer and the right to existence is intent: "the essence of genocide is
not the actual destruction of a group - in our case, a people - but the
intent to destroy it as such (in whole or in part). 1117 This implies that if a
group, for example a "people," however defined, is destroyed, but no in-
tent to destroy exists, then no genocide occurs. Conversely, one individual
murder fits this essence of genocide if the act of murder is designed to
further the extinction of a people.
The situation of the Kurds after the Gulf War involved less the re-
moval of people than did the Kurdish plight before that war.' 28 Nonethe-
less, Payam Akhavan believes that after the war the requisite intent for
genocide existed. He states that "it was not in question that the deliber-
ate policy of the Iraqi authorities had resulted in conditions which were
so extreme as to cause the mass exodus of Kurds to neighboring
States."' 29 Given that the receiving area consisted of "inhospitable re-
gions where their survival may [have been] threatened," Akhavan recom-
123. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened
for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 28 I.L.M. 763 [hereinafter Genocide Conven-
tion]. Specific acts include "(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing mea-
sures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group." Id. Cf. RESTATEMENT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 31, § 702.
124. Dinstein, supra note 116, at 105.
125. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 23.
126. Distinctions between ethnocide and genocide are de-emphasized by focusing on
existence rather than extermination. This is a constructive, preventative approach to such
comparison. Some causes are common to both ethnocide and genocide, one of which causes
is discrimination. For example, prevention of discrimination would remove religious intoler-
ance. One commentator refers to intolerance as "one of the decisive causes of genocide."
WARWICK McKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (1983).
127. Dinstein, supra note 116, at 105 (citing NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CON-
VENTION: A COMMENTARY 58 (1960)).
128. See supra note 5.
129. Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention Through the Advisory
Opinion Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 297 (1991).
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mends that the International Court of Justice give an advisory opinion on
whether the Iraqi policy constituted "'deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in
part' within the meaning of the Genocide Convention. 1 3 0 A positive re-
sponse, meaning genocide occurred, would carry significance despite arti-
cle 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.131
Depending upon circumstances, the governmental intent required to
raise an act to genocidal level may vary. For example, a high degree of
centralized authority and quasi-bureaucratic organization in the govern-
ment, like that of Iraq, is not always required. According to Chalk and
Jonassohn, an exception has been "when the victim group is numerically
small." They give as an example the phenomenon of population transfer,
"such as the indigenous tribes wiped out by colonizing settlers."132 De-
spite their loose use of the term "colonizing," under their analysis settle-
ments may cause of genocide. An analysis such as theirs should be ex-
amined for its validity in the case of the Indonesian presence in East
Timor.
In summary regarding genocide, governmental participation in popu-
lation transfer might take the form of force, as in the case of some remov-
als. Or it might take the form of encouragement or sponsorship, as in the
example of some settlements. Although containing less obvious intent, the
latter involvement needs to be examined further, through concerted case
study, for the possibility that such settlements may result in the genocide
of original inhabitants. Like the arguments in regard to voluntariness and
freedom of movement, legal reasoning regarding genocide is more obvious
to cases of removals but may apply also to settlements. As the concept of
genocide is relatively blind to issues of the permeability of international
frontiers and as it applies even outside of belligerency, it is crucial to any
broad concept of population transfer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law on genocide, like that on self-determination, refers to groups
rather than individuals. Development of the consciousness of interna-
tional law towards collectivities is important to a holistic legal approach
towards uprooted people. However, given the differences between remov-
als and settlements mentioned herein, international law is distant from
treating removals and settlements as one category per se. A broad treat-
ment should be pursued, especially where the motivations for and the ef-
fects of both types are egregious. Some variances or differences between
the two types may be just noise. The law on population transfer is unde-
130. Id. at 297-98.
131. Akhavan states that "given its status as a 'crime against humanity,' an inference
that genocide exists would definitely put into question the proposition that the matter is
one 'essentially within the jurisdiction' of Iraq." Id. at 298. See also Leslie Gelb, The
Strange Story of Mr. Bush Dealing With Saddam, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 5, 1992, at 4.
132. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 28.
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veloped and, thus, somewhat confusing. The coherent legal study of pop-
ulation transfer will gain speed as the realization grows that it is "inaccu-
rate to use the passive voice to describe much of the world's population
flows." 133
133. Weiner, supra note 6, at 7.
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